The paper establishes the following: First, money is neutral even if there is a is a non-zero stock of non-monetary nominal public debt, because the government adjust real taxes to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint.
I. Introduction
Two of the oldest questions in monetary economics concern the neutrality of money and the determinacy of the price level when the monetary authority pegs the nominal rate of interest (see e.g. Hume [1752] , Fisher [1896 Fisher [ , 1907 Fisher [ , 1911 Fisher [ , 1930 , Wicksell [1989, 1907] , Keynes [1923] , Hayek [1931] , Patinkin [1965] , Patinkin and Steiger [1989] , Tobin [1976] , Lucas [1972] , Brock [1974] , Gale [1982] , Sargent and Wallace [1982] , Canzoneri, Henderson and Rogoff [1983] , Grandmont [1983] and McCallum [1986 McCallum [ , 1997a ). In a number of important and influential recent papers Woodford [1994, 1995, 1996, 1997] , has revisited these venerable issues using modern dynamic optimising models. His investigations extended to two further issues that turn out to be intimately related to the earlier duo: fiscal theories of the price level (see also McCallum [1997b] , Luttmer [1997] and Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [1998] ) and the determinacy of the price level when the efficiency of the transactions mechanism is enhanced to the point that money becomes redundant.
This paper demonstrates that all four issues can be analysed and resolved in a simple dynamic optimising model using only the two most basic tools of the trade. The first is verifying the model's equilibrium conditions for zero-degree homogeneity of the real endogenous variables and for first-degree homogeneity of the endogenous nominal prices in various exogenous nominal asset stocks . The second is equation counting. Once the 1 equilibrium conditions are written down in a transparent manner, all the results follow by direct inspection of these equilibrium conditions. The government's intertemporal budget constraint plays a central role in resolving all four issues. This constraint requires that the initial value of the government's interest-bearing liabilities is equal to the present discounted value of its current and future primary (non-interest) budget surpluses plus the present discounted value of its current and future seigniorage (net issuance of non-interest-bearing 'base' money). Proper consideration of the government's intertemporal budget constraint leads to the conclusion Woodford's fiscal theory of the price level, according to which for certain fiscal rules the equilibrium price level sequence is independent of the nominal money stock sequence, is invalid, because it represents a 'solution' to an ill-posed general equilibrium problem. It also implies that there is no price level indeterminacy when the government pegs the nominal interest rate, if the transactions technology has 'cash-in-advance' features, although the equilibrium price level will be hysteretic, or history-dependent, in this case.
The vehicle for analysing these issues in this paper is a simple endowment economy 2 in which money plays a transactions role. The government's real exhaustive spending programme is exogenously given. So is either the sequence of nominal money stocks or the sequence of nominal interest rates. Initial stocks of its monetary and non-monetary liabilities are predetermined. Current and future taxes are constrained by the requirement that the government's intertemporal budget constraint or solvency constraint must always be satisfied.
The medium of exchange or transactions medium is assumed to be the non-interest-bearing financial liability of the government, fiat money. No attempt is made to derive this identification of the transactions medium and a specific government financial liability from deep transactions-microeconomic first principles. The interesting questions all arise in the context of non-negative nominal interest rate equilibria, in which money is (weakly) dominated as a store of value and is held only to the extent that it facilitates exchange.
In addition to emphasising the importance of the public and private sector balance sheets, the paper also questions the relevance for monetary policy of arguments based on the study of the limiting behaviour of economies, when some parameter indexing the efficiency 
of the transactions mechanism increases without bound. Woodford [1997] has considered under what conditions the equilibrium price sequence of such economies converges to an equilibrium price sequence of the cashless economy. I argue that for policy purposes it is more relevant to consider improvements in transactions efficiency occurring in real (calendar) time in a single economy, rather than a comparison of a sequence of economies, each of which is endowed with a fixed transactions efficiency.
II. The Model
To create the most transparent benchmark, I choose a model without private sector nominal rigidities of any kind. Clearly, in a model with nominal price stickiness, the predetermined initial price level would automatically ensure price level determinacy . The 3 model also exhibits first-order debt neutrality. If the government and private sectors satisfy their solvency constraints, then for any given sequence of government spending and nominal money stocks, the substitution of lump-sum taxes financing for bond financing leaves all equilibrium real and nominal variables unchanged. money at the beginning of period t and P the period t price level (see Feenstra [1986] and t [1986] ). The use of the beginning-of period money stock in the shopping function
II.1 The Private Sector

McCallum
gives it a cash-in-advance flavour. For simplicity a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas specification is adopted for the shopping function .
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As decreases, the efficiency of the monetary transactions process improves. In the limit as 0, the transactions technology improves to the point that money becomes redundant as a transactions medium.
Most of the substantive conclusions of the paper would be unaffected if I had adopted a money-in-the-direct-utility-function approach or a cash-in-advance approach instead.
However, the model's price level (in)determinacy properties under a nominal interest rate peg are affected if an alternative ('cash-in-arrears') specification of the shopping function is adopted which allows the end-of-period money stock in period t to facilitate transactions during period t. Equation (2) is then replaced by Unless stated otherwise, the shopping function specification of equation (2) will be used.
The household budget identity constraint is
where B is the number of one-period nominal bonds, b the number of one-period indext t linked bonds held at the beginning of period t, i is the one-period nominal interest rate t+1 between periods t and t+1 and r the one-period real rate of interest.
t+1
With efficient financial markets and in the absence of uncertainty, expected and actual pecuniary rates of return on the two non-monetary assets are equalized. Thus
The nominal market value of total private financial wealth at the beginning of period t+1 is
The household budget identity can be rewritten as 
Equation (9) is the familiar consumption Euler equation, modified to reflect money's use as an intermediate input in the household production function. Equation (10) shows that optimal real money balances are proportional to private consumption and vary inversely with the short nominal rate of interest.
If the shopping function with the end-of-period money stock given in (3) had been adopted instead, the Euler equation for consumption (9) and the money demand function (10) would have to be replaced with (11) and (12) respectively.
Equations (3), (11) and (12) only play a role in the discussions of the fiscal theories of the price level in Section IV and of price level determinacy under a nominal interest rate peg in Section VI.1.
II.2 The government sector.
I view the government as a consolidated general government and central bank. Its budget identity is.
where real exhaustive public spending, public consumption spending, g 0, is exogenous. Without loss of generality, I can restrict the permissible sequences of the nominal money stock to those supporting equilibria with non-negative short nominal interest rates.
Negative nominal interest rates would be inconsistent with equilibrium, as this would create arbitrage opportunities for households who would borrow at the negative nominal rate from the government and invest these loans in zero nominal interest rate money.
The equilibrium conditions determine only the present discounted value of the government's current and future taxes. The timing of the tax payments, and any associated variations in the sequences of the three debt instruments after period 1, are of no significance for either real or nominal equilibrium values. This is not surprising, in this representative agent model with its first-order debt neutrality.
I now introduce the concepts of conditional and unconditional neutrality.
Definition 1: Unconditional Neutrality.
A set of assets is (jointly) unconditionally neutral if the same proportional change in the initial and all future values of each stock leaves real variables including real taxes and real government debt unchanged and raises all nominal prices by the same proportion.
Definition 2: Conditional Neutrality. Proposition 2.
A set of assets is (jointly) conditionally neutral if the same proportional changes in the initial and all future values of each stock leaves real variables other than real taxes and real government debt unchanged and raises all nominal prices by the same proportion, but
M t1 N t j2 -t /(1
Money is conditionally neutral but not unconditionally neutral unless the initial value of the non-monetary nominal public debt instruments equals zero.
Proof: The proof of Proposition 2 is also straightforward. The public debt stocks, including the nominally denominated public debt stocks, do not affect the determination of the equilibrium values of {c , e , i , r }, t = 1, 2, ... . From (20) , holding with equality, the
price level in each period changes by the same proportion as the money stock. Consider the government's intertemporal budget constraint for period 1, (24). P changes by the same t proportion as M and nominal and real interest rates are unchanged. Thus, to continue to
satisfy the government's intertemporal budget constraint (24), the present discounted value of current and future taxes will have to change according to (26) . Any change the sequence of current and future taxes satisfying (26) will ensure (conditional) neutrality of money. Note that (17) If instead of a representative agent model of household behaviour we had adopted an overlapping generations model, any change in the present discounted value of current and future taxes would alter the real equilibrium of the economy, to the extent that it redistributes wealth between generations. Such intergenerational distributional effects can be neutralized if the government has unrestricted age-specific lump-sum taxes and transfers at its disposal (see e.g. Buiter and Kletzer [1997] ). In a two-period OLG model, versions of Propositions 1 and 2 hold if the government can tax the young and transfer the proceeds to the old.
An implication of Propositions 1 or 2 is that if the only government debt is index-linked debt, money will be unconditionally neutral.
Finally, he neutrality propositions of this section go through unchanged if the 'cashin-arrears' specification of the transactions technology given in equation (3) is substituted for the 'cash-in-advance' specification of equation (2).
IV. A Fiscal Theory of the Price Level?
Woodford's fiscal theory of the price level (Woodford [1995] ) states that, for certain fiscal rules, the equilibrium price level sequence is independent of the sequence of nominal money stocks. This section demonstrates that this theory is the result of two complementary errors, resulting in an ill-posed general equilibrium model.
The first error is the specification of an overdetermined fiscal-financial programme:
for given initial stocks of the government debt instruments: both the sequence of real public spending and the sequence of real taxes net of the real value of new monetary issues are given exogenously. In general, the real public debt sequence then becomes non-stationary, and the government solvency constraint need not be satisfied.
The second error is an unwarranted change in the assumptions about when the government solvency constraint applies. Woodford no longer requires that the government solvency constraint hold for all sequences of price levels and interest rates. Instead he requires only that the solvency constraint hold in equilibrium, that is, for equilibrium sequences of prices and other endogenous variables. In addition, he imposes an arbitrary restriction on the permissible configurations of the exogenous public spending and revenue sequences and the predetermined initial stock of non-monetary nominal debt. This relaxations violate the normal rules for constructing a well-posed general equilibrium model.
Household and government decision rules, whether derived from optimising behaviour, as is the case for households in this model, or imposed in an ad-hoc manner, as is the case for the government in this example, are constrained by intertemporal budget constraints that must hold for all price sequences (and other sequences of endogenous variables) and for all initial non-monetary debt stocks. These decision rules, derived for arbitrary price sequences, then determine, jointly with the market-clearing conditions, initial conditions and other systemwide constraints, the equilibrium sequences of prices and other endogenous variables. The budget constraints must be satisfied, however, both for equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium sequences of the endogenous variables in order for these budget constraints to co-determine these equilibrium sequences.
It is instructive to reproduce Woodford's argument in some detail. I will develop the fiscal approach when the government follows a monetary rule (as in Woodford [1995] ). As shown below, the fiscal approach can never be valid when the transactions technology has cash-in-advance features (as in equation (2)), but is internally consistent, albeit ill-posed, when the transactions technology has cash-in-arrears features (as in equation (3). Exactly the same strictures apply when the government follows an exogenous nominal interest rate rule.
Let denote the nominal value of the non-monetary debt of the government, that is
The government budget identity can be rewritten as
As in the previous sub-section, the government spending sequence is exogenous, the 
There is a unique value of the initial price level, P that permits the government 1 solvency constraint (34) to be satisfied (Woodford [1995] ). With the transactions technology used in this paper (both for the cash-in-advance and cash-in-arrears versions), money and consumption are strongly non-separable, as is evident from the appearance of the nominal interest rate in the resource constraint (32). This means that even in the simplest case, where the endowment sequence {y } , the real public spending sequence {g }, the sequence of real 
so the nominal debt stock would have to be constant, which would only be true for a very restricted set of initial conditions and parameter values.
With exogenously given sequences of government spending and taxes, the solvency constraint will in general be violated, unless there is an initial non-zero stock of nonmonetary nominal debt, whose real value can be equated to the present value of future primary surpluses minus the value of the initial stock of index-linked public debt, through an appropriate assignment of the initial price level.
Note that for this approach to work, the following arbitrary restriction on the fiscalfinancial programme must be satisfied for all t 1, or, in the case of a stationary environment,
The necessity of condition (36) 
( 37)) is an arbitrary restriction on the fiscal-financial programme of the government.
Governments could e.g. have index-linked debt in excess of the present value of their future primary surpluses (the right-hand side of (36) 
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If instead we adopt the cash-in-arrears technology (3), the resulting money demand function and resource constraint, given by equations (41) and (42), replacing (20) and (32) respectively, are more promising from the point of view of the fiscal theory of the price level
What we get, however, is at most a fiscal theory of the initial price level. If the real interest rate sequence depends on the nominal money stock sequence, it is clear from (34) that we don't have a fiscal theory of the initial price level, P . Assume the real interest rate sequence 1 is independent of the nominal money stock sequence. In that case the initial price level, P , is 1 independent of the nominal money stock sequence. From (41) and (42) nominal money stock sequence and thus that P and all subsequent price levels depend on the 2 money stock. By influencing the evolution of the nominal non-monetary debt (through its effect on the nominal interest rate), the money stock co-determines the equilibrium price sequence . In fact, it is easily checked that the real interest rate sequence is not independent 13 of the nominal money stock sequence . The price level sequence, including the initial price 14 level, therefore depends on the nominal money stock sequence.
The reason for this is that the transactions technology of this model incorporates a strong form of non-separability of money and consumption. This is reflected in the Euler equation for consumption , which shows that, out of steady state, consumption growth depends both on the real and on the nominal interest rates. In order to get an equilibrium in which the initial price level is independent of the money stock, either a strict cash-in-advance or an (end-of-period) money-in-the utility function approach with money and consumption entering separably. The following example, taken from McCallum [1997b] illustrates this.
Households optimise the objective functional given in (43) subject to the earlier household budget identity and solvency constraint. The transactions technology is dropped.
Real public spending, g, real taxes plus real seigniorage, , and the stock of index-linked debt, b, are constant.
The optimal household programme is characterised by and Since y = c + g , the only equilibrium that does not violate the government solvency constraint is given by (46)
Here we have the pure fiscal theory of the initial price level . The initial price level 15 is uniquely determined by equation (48) for t = 1, and is proportional to the initial stock of nominal non-monetary debt (a strict quantity theory of nominal bonds). Given this initial price level, all future price levels are determined from (49) and
Future price levels (for t 2) are not independent of the sequence of nominal money stocks, because the nominal money stock sequence affects the nominal interest rate and thus the evolution of the future stock of nominal non-monetary debt. Given B (and thus P ) a t t larger value of M implies a lower nominal interest rate and therefore, with a constant real t+1 interest rate, a lower future nominal debt stock, B and a lower future price level.
t+1
In summary, the flaws in the fiscal theory of the price level are that the government's fiscal-financial programme is overdetermined and that the government solvency constraint is required to hold only for equilibrium price level sequences rather than for all price sequences, and only for arbitrarily restricted configurations of public spending, revenues and initial debt stocks. The discussion also makes clear that even if one is willing to live with these flaws, the fiscal theory of the price level is only a purely fiscal theory of the initial price level. Even then further restrictions have to be imposed on the way money is introduced into the model. ultimately, a rejection of some of his assumptions. These assumptions happen to be so fundamental to the construction of any general equilibrium model (and indeed to any model of rational choice subject to budget constraints), that I would not consider the fiscal approach to be a high-priority candidate for empirical verification or refutation. This view does not seem to be universally shared, however (see e.g. Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [1998] ).
It will be clear that Woodford's fiscal theory of the price level is quite distinct from Sargent and Wallace's [1981] fiscal theory of inflation. In their "Unpleasant Monetarist
Arithmetic" paper, government policy follows two regimes. For a finite period of time, the growth rate of the nominal money stock is fixed exogenously. The primary deficit as a fractions of GDP is exogenous and constant throughout. During this interval, government borrowing is determined residually. Following the fixed interval, the ratio of non-monetary public debt to GDP is stabilized at the value achieved at the end of the interval. The central point is that, if the (exogenous) monetary growth rate is reduced temporarily without any change in the (exogenous) primary government deficit-GDP ratio, non-monetary public debt will accumulate at a faster rate for as long as the lower growth rate of nominal money is in effect. When following the fixed interval of lower monetary growth, the government's nonmonetary debt-GDP ratio is stabilised, monetary growth is determined residually. If the real interest rate exceeds the growth rate of real GDP, the higher debt-GDP ratio reached at the end of the fixed interval of lower monetary growth, implies a higher subsequent growth rate of nominal money and a higher rate of inflation. When velocity is a function of the expected rate of inflation, it is even possible that the inflation rate rises even during the interval of lower monetary growth. While in the Sargent-Wallace model inflation is a monetary phenomenon, ultimately, for unchanged fiscal fundamentals (real taxes and spending) money is a fiscal phenomenon. In Sargent and Wallace, the government satisfies its solvency constraint for all price sequences and the fiscal-financial programme is not overdetermined.
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Theirs is a valid, well-posed, theory.
V. Neutrality and price level determinacy in a world without money.
We now return to the model of section II. Consider the limiting case of the economy where the efficiency of the payment mechanism has improved to the point that money has become redundant. This occurs when = 0. In the limit, as 0, real money demand goes The equilibrium when = 0, is characterized by:
Given {g } , t = 1, 2, ..., the equilibrium conditions (52), (53) and (54) It is immediately apparent from (54) that, if the real present discounted value of future taxes, , is exogenous, P is strictly proportional to , the nominal value of theory of nominal non-monetary public debt is just a version for a demonetised economy of the fiscal theory of the price level considered in Section IV. As in Section IV, it is clear that, for given initial stocks of government liabilities, a given real spending programme (and a given sequence of monetary financing), the present discounted value of future taxes should be treated as an endogenous variable, which assumes the value required to satisfy the government's solvency constraint.
It is also apparent from equation (54) and the requirement that P 0, that this quantity theory of nominal public debt could only hold if condition (36) is satisfied, the same arbitrary restriction that had to be satisfied for the fiscal theory of the price level to apply in an economy with money. Note that this implies, again as in Section IV, that for the demonetised economy to have a nominal anchor, exogenous nominal and real payment streams (or (nonmonetary) nominal and real assets and liabilities), both have to enter in the government's intertemporal budget constraint.
In the demonetised economy, money has become solely a numeraire. While securities may be denominated in terms of money, interest payments and repayment of principal are not made in money, which no longer has any physical existence. We know from general equilibrium theory that the numeraire need not be a good or bundle of goods in the commodity space. Indeed, the numeraire could be something entirely fictitious, such as phlogiston. Only relative prices matter and are determinate. The model of this paper follows the literature in identifying the numeraire with the medium of exchange. In reality, bounded rationality arguments favour such an identification, but the two functions, numeraire and medium of exchange, are logically and functionally distinct . When = 0, there no longer is With real taxes endogenously determined to satisfy the government solvency constraint, the limit as 0, the price level, P , is not the price level when = 0 . By the t monetary equilibrium condition, holding with equality as long as > 0, we see that, for a given sequence of the nominal money stock, the price level increases without bound as 0, that is, . When = 0, the price level is indeterminate.
VI. Nominal interest rate rules VI.1 Price level determinacy under a fixed nominal interest rule in an economy with money
We return to the case where money has a transactions function, > 0, but now suppose the government pegs the nominal interest rate each period at a positive value:
In each period, t, the government and households take as given (or predetermined) the
32 financial assets carried into that period. We first consider the cash-in-advance transactions technology (2).
Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the economy under an exogenous (or open-loop) nominal interest rate rule is given by equations (19) to (23) of nominal prices , given the sequence of nominal interest. With the initial price level pinned down by the pre-determined initial nominal money stock, the entire equilibrium price sequence is determinate.
Key to this result is the assumption that transactions during period t are facilitated by the real value of the nominal money stock in existence at the beginning of that period (equation (2)). Since the initial stock of money is inherited from the previous period, the How plausible is the transactions assumption embodied in equation (2) (19), (20) and (21), by, respectively, equations (11), (12) wages and prices by the same proportion as P . End-of period real money balances, M /P ,
This suggests the following proposition. 
VI.2 Price level determinacy under an interest pegging policy in an economy without money
Consider again the case where the transactions technology requires the use of the initial money stock (equation (2)) . Now = 0 and money demand is zero. The equilibrium 23 of this economy can be characterized by equations (52) to (55) Consumption and the real interest rate are determined by equations (52) and (53) .
They are independent of the nominal interest rate sequence . From equations (59) and (54) 25 it follows that the price level and the present discounted value of taxes are still indeterminate.
There is no boundary condition to pin down the initial value P . The same holds for the more 1 general interest rate function given in (57). Neither the price level nor the rate of inflation (or the nominal interest rate) are determinate.
Woodford's analysis is not inconsistent with this conclusion. He does not assert that
the price level is determinate in the demonetised, or cashless, economy. His proposition is that the limit, as 0, of the equilibrium price sequence for the economy with money, is well-behaved and that this limit is an equilibrium price sequence of the cashless economy (Woodford [1997] ). While the model of this paper supports that conclusion, I question its policy relevance.
The first reason is that, since any initial price level is consistent with equilibrium in the cashless economy, the fact that equilibrium for the monetary economy converges to one of a continuum of possible price level equilibria for the demonetised economy, offers scant comfort to those contemplating the eventual disappearance of money in countries with advanced financial systems.
The second and more fundamental reason is that the limiting process considered by Woodford is not economically interesting. Woodford's proposition is that the limit, as 0, of the equilibrium for the economy with money, is an equilibrium of the cashless economy.
Will this come as a relief to the central bankers of the cashless future? Once the economy is demonetised ( = 0), price level indeterminacy is present. If we think of the improvement in the transactions technology as taking place in real time ( falls period-by-period and reaches 0 after a finite number of periods), the indeterminacy after has reached zero will cause indeterminacy problems even in the periods before reaches zero.
This can be demonstrated as follows. Instead of assuming to be constant, assume the following: 0; > 0; is a non-increasing function of t, and = 0 for some finite
The price level will be indeterminate in this economy from period t+N on. Since , the price level is also indeterminate in all earlier periods.
Woodford's process of considering the limit as 0 is not a process taking place in calendar time. It involves sequences of 'parallel histories', each successive one indexed by a lower, but constant, value of . This mathematical convergence concept is clearly inappropriate as a guide to the behaviour of an economy faced, in calendar time, with a declining sequence of .'s and reaching a cashless state at some finite future date. The need to distinguish between the two amounts to the theorist's version of the familiar econometric adage: do not draw time series inferences from cross-sectional regressions.
VII. Conclusions
The paper makes seven points.
First, when money has a transactions role, money is conditionally neutral if there is a non-zero stock of nominally denominated non-monetary government financial liabilities.
Neutrality is obtained because the government adjusts the path of real taxes to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint.
Second, money and all non-monetary nominal government liabilities are jointly unconditionally neutral. Neutrality is obtained without any change in real taxes.
Third, Woodford's fiscal theory of the price level is invalid because it represents a 'solution' to an ill-posed general equilibrium problem. It combines an overdetermined fiscalfinancial programme with an unwarranted weakening of the government's intertemporal budget constraint, requiring it to hold only in equilibrium and for arbitrarily restricted configurations of public spending, revenues and initial debt stocks.. 8. An 'outside' claim is an asset of the private sector that is not also a liability of the private sector, that is, an outside claim is a claim that is in non-zero net supply to the private sector as a whole.
9. Note that = .
10. We still restrict the analysis to sequences of exogenous variables and initial conditions that support a positive equilibrium nominal interest rate sequence.
11. or only index-linked debt and foreign-currency-denominated debt.
12. The resource constraint (38) depends, in period 1, on the predetermined nominal interest rate i .
1
13.If the government followed an exogenous nominal interest rate rule instead of an exogenous nominal money stock rule, the initial price level and all future price levels would be determined 'independently' of the sequence of nominal money stocks. That, of course, not a very helpful result, since the nominal money stock sequence is endogenous in this case. The flaws in the fiscal theory of the price level are independent of whether the government follows a monetary rule or an interest rate rule.
14. Consider doubling all current and future nominal money stocks. If the real interest sequence and P were to be unaffected, it must be true (from (41), and (42), that i falls. From the 1 2 government's budget identity, for a given P , a lower nominal interest rate i implies a lower 1 2 value of B and, if the real interest rate sequence is unaffected, a lower value of P . Except for 2 2 a very restricted set of parameter configurations and initial conditions, the fall in the nominal interest rate and the fall in the future price level will alter the real interest rate in period 2.
15. The condition must of course be satisfied.
.
16.An even more dramatic example would be to fix exogenously the entire private consumption sequence {c }, but such sequences would of course not, in general, satisfy the necessary t conditions for optimality.
17. When monetary growth becomes endogenous, in phase two, conditions must be satisfied to ensure that enough real seigniorage can be extracted to finance the deficit through monetary issuance.
18. The British Guinea is an example of a unit of account that was not a means of payment. In medieval Iceland, dried fish were used as the unit of account, but (fortunately for the Icelanders)not as the medium of exchange. I am indebted to Anne Sibert for the dried fish.
19. Stationary sequences of the real variables supported by constant values of g and I.
20. However, a change in the present discounted value of taxes is required to satisfy the government's intertemporal budget constraint if there is a non-zero stock of non-monetary nominal public debt. 25. It is indeed independent of any nominal interest rate rule.
